Game Simulation Analysis of Radical Innovation Processes of High-tech Enterprises based on WoO-EGT Model by Zhen Zhang & Jintian Yu
518    Technical Gazette 26, 2(2019), 518-526
ISSN 1330-3651 (Print), ISSN 1848-6339 (Online)     https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190215075504 
Original scientific papers 
Game Simulation Analysis of Radical Innovation Processes of High-tech Enterprises 
based on WoO-EGT Model 
Zhen ZHANG, Jintian YU 
Abstract: An analysis of the evolution law of radical innovation process (RIP) and an identification of the RIP’s influencing factors, particularly to solve the low success rates 
of the radical innovation of high-tech enterprises, is the focus of this study. The dynamic evolution of RIP can be explained from the perspective of market timing of innovation 
processes. Moreover, the key influencing factors and the impact mechanism of the process of evolution need to be identified. The window of opportunity-evolutionary game 
theory (WoO-EGT) model of RIP, which was built by combining WoO and EGT, was used to analyze the dynamic evolutions of the RIPs of existing and new high-tech 
enterprises. The three categories of RIP evolution when WoO was opened—only locking technology, only breakthrough technology, and coexistence of locking and 
breakthrough technologies—were determined and verified. Then, the impact mechanisms of the returns and initial proportion of breakthrough technologies on RIP evolution 
were dynamically and numerically simulated by Matlab. Results show that WoO is the best time for enterprises to implement RIP, and the three game results of RIP evolution 
of high-tech enterprises under WoO are only locking technology, only breakthrough technology, and both locking and breakthrough technologies, which occupy certain 
proportions in the market. Moreover, the returns of breakthrough technology play a decisive role in the evolution results of RIP, and the initial proportion of breakthrough 
technology affects the evolution speed of RIP. According to the research, the WoO-EGT model built in this study is feasible in dynamically analyzing the RIPs. The WoO-
EGT model can help overcome the deficiencies of the static model of RIP and provide new decision-making ideas and methods for analyzing the RIPs of high-tech enterprises, 
thus contributing to the improvement of the success rates of radical innovation. 
Keywords: Evolutionary Game; High-tech Enterprises; Radical Innovation Process (RIP); Window of Opportunity (WoO) 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the age of total innovation, radical innovation has 
caught enterprises’ attention more than incremental 
innovation, especially among high-tech enterprises with 
rapid technological changes; in such scenarios, radical 
innovations are crucial in solving the technological lock-in 
problems of enterprises and their industries, and they are 
essential elements in improving the sustainable 
competitiveness of enterprises [1, 2]. However, the success 
rates of the radical innovations of high-tech enterprises 
have continuously declined in recent years. According to 
statistics, among over 24000 high-tech products distributed 
in the market, only 15 have achieved technological 
breakthroughs [3]. Moreover, 47% of these radical 
innovations reportedly have failed, and nearly 75% of the 
new products have faced failure upon launching [4]. A 
radical innovation process (RIP) can be described as the 
ability to overcome the restraints of existing technological 
lock-ins within the enterprise or the industry, and it is often 
associated with the introduction of breakthroughs through 
independent R&D or purchase, which then provide the 
products with new or improved performance in the market 
[5-6]. Thus, the RIPs of high-tech enterprises are expected 
to challenge the existing locking technologies in the market. 
Similar to the locking technologies in the external market, 
the RIP of an enterprise involves a process of dynamic 
evolution, which implies that the success rate of radical 
innovation is closely related to the timing of market entry. 
Furthermore, RIP is affected by the returns and initial 
proportion of breakthrough technologies when the 
opportunities tied to these technologies present themselves. 
Therefore, finding the opportunities for RIPs to enter the 
market and identifying the influencing factors of these 
opportunities and their impact mechanisms on the dynamic 
evolution of RIPs are the key elements for improving the 
success rates of the radical innovation of high-tech 
enterprises. 
However, the existing research on the market timing of 
RIPs and the identification of their influencing factors 
under this timing context has paid more attention to policy 
system, organizational management and external 
investment [7-11], among others, at the institutional 
economic level rather than on the technological factors, 
such as technological returns and initial proportion of 
technology. In addition, by being limited to certain static 
methods (e.g., case analysis, Bayesian decision-making 
method, Malmquist productivity index, data envelope 
analysis (DEA), etc. [12-15]), the research on the impact 
mechanism of the factors affecting RIP has ignored the 
non-linearity and high uncertainty of RIP [16]. The 
existing research on RIP has also mainly analyzed the 
factors affecting the institutional economy, whereas the 
technological factors and the impact mechanism, 
influencing factors, and dynamic evolution of RIP have 
been largely ignored. To overcome the research gap, the 
window of opportunity-evolutionary game theory (WoO-
EGT) model of RIP is built by combining WoO and EGT. 
In particular, the dynamic evolutions of RIP of existing and 
new high-tech enterprises are analyzed, the results of these 
dynamic evolutions in the WoO context are obtained, and 
the impact mechanisms of radical technological returns and 
initial proportion on RIP evolution are simulated 
numerically in Matlab. Subsequently, countermeasures are 
proposed to promote RIP evolution, which is of great 
practical significance to improving the success rates of 
radical innovations of high-tech enterprises. 
2 STATE OF THE ART 
Several research results regarding the market timing of 
RIP and the identification of its influencing factors under 
the timing context have been achieved. Scholars usually 
conduct their analyses based on the specific situations of 
RIPs of high-tech enterprises. Isaksen emphasized the 
important role of external investment on RIP based on the 
existing technological lock-in effect of industrial and 
Zhen ZHANG, Jintian YU: Game Simulation Analysis of Radical Innovation Processes of High-tech Enterprises based on WoO-EGT Model 
Tehnički vjesnik 26, 2(2019), 518-526                                                                                                                                                                                                             519 
enterprise development in Norway [8]. Cecere et al. 
focused on technological lock-in in radical ecological 
innovation to analyze technological niche, enterprise 
strategy change, user guidance, and management 
regulations in a radical ecological innovation process [14]. 
Perra et al. attributed the success rates of radical 
innovations of established companies to management 
identity [7]. Schreyogg and Sydow proposed the 
implementation of RIP along with the driving mechanism 
formed by existing technological lock-ins [17]. Tsiapa et al. 
explained the positive effect of policy and economic 
factors on RIP during economic recovery by analyzing 
enterprise technological lock-in during the economic crisis 
of European Union (EU) [12]. The above research on the 
market timing of RIP and its influencing factors under the 
timing context has focused mainly on the institutional and 
economic factors and the timing of market technological 
lock-in (i.e., policy system, organizational management, 
external investment, etc.). However, the technological 
factors of RIP, such as the returns and initial proportion of 
existing locking technologies and breakthrough 
technologies, have been largely ignored by extant research. 
The impact mechanisms of the influencing factors of 
RIP have been mainly derived through the following 
methods: literature review, case analysis, Bayesian 
decision-making method, Malmquist productivity index, 
and DEA non-parametric technology [18-22]. Cecere et al. 
classified the impact mechanisms of technological niche 
and other factors on the radical ecological innovation 
processes of high-tech enterprises in the form of literature 
review [14]. Thrane et al. analyzed the impact mechanism 
of cognitive framework and mediation on RIP by taking 
high-tech medical service enterprises in North Europe as 
examples [23]. Lawrence et al. studied the importance of 
non-market forces with radical innovation by referring to 
nuclear energy technology enterprises in Europe as the 
object [13]. The literature review and case analysis 
methods, which can explain the praxis of existing theories 
or extend their theoretical development, both belong to the 
category of qualitative analysis. However, qualitative 
analysis is highly subjective and thus reduces the scientific 
nature of the impact mechanism. Crouch and Farrell 
studied the mechanism of past experience transfer and 
sudden events influencing RIP by using the Bayesian 
decision-making method [15]. This particular method can 
effectively analyze the action direction of influencing 
factors. However, due to limitations in parametric 
modeling and analysis, the Bayesian decision-making 
method cannot easily detect the impact degree of 
influencing factors. Tsiapa et al. used the Malmquist and 
DEA methods to explain the RIPs of EU enterprises and 
the action mechanism of relevant policies (i.e., these 
methods can effectively investigate the impact degree of 
influencing factors). However, the empirical analysis of 
large volumes of data, which is characteristic of both 
methods, are likely only limited to the academic level, as 
evidenced by the inapplicability of the results among real-
world heterogeneous high-tech enterprises [13]. Many 
scholars have also analyzed the impact mechanism of 
influencing factors through traditional static methods. 
However, the RIPs of high-tech enterprises are 
characterized by high uncertainty, information asymmetry, 
non-linearity, and constant trials and learning. The 
analyses of RIPs of high-tech enterprises based on static 
evaluation can neither expound the process of how 
equilibrium is reached nor detect the impact degree of 
influencing factors during RIP evolution.  
As a potential solution to the above mentioned 
problems, the WoO-EGT model of RIP evolution is built 
by combining WoO and EGT. In particular, the dynamic 
evolution of RIPs of existing and new high-tech enterprises 
is analyzed, the evolution variables of RIPs when WoO is 
opened are calculated by using a replicated dynamic 
equation, and the mechanisms of the returns and initial 
proportion of breakthrough technologies that influence the 
evolution of RIP are dynamically simulated in Matlab [24, 
25]. On this basis, countermeasures are proposed to 
promote the process evolution and improve the success rate 
of a radical innovation. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The WoO 
of RIP, the basic assumptions and payoff function, the 
WoO-EGT model of dynamic evolution of RIP, and the 
intelligent simulation design by using Matlab are discussed 
in Section 3. The dynamic evolution law of RIP when WoO 
is opened and the impact mechanism of relevant factors are 
analyzed in Section 4. The conclusions are drawn in 
Section 5. 
 
3 MODEL BUILDING 
3.1 Market Timing of RIP 
 
RIP is expected to replace the existing technologies in 
the market with new breakthrough technologies. The 
market timing of RIP is closely related to the evolution of 
existing technologies in the market. According to the A-U 
model and the technology life cycle theory [26], existing 
technologies in the market evolve through the process of 
germination, growth, maturity, and recession. The period 
called later maturity is regarded as the market timing of 
RIP, and it is regarded as the WoO of RIP. Given that the 
later-maturity period of existing technologies in the market 
is limited to the incremental innovation of existing locking 
technologies, and considering that their technological 
potentials have been fully mined in the growth stage, the 
performance of technology products will have no 
substantial changes in this stage [27]. However, if the 
breakthrough technology can be introduced to the market 
at this stage, then either the performance of products can 
be remarkably improved or new performance products may 
be provided, which can increase the acceptance probability 
of products [28]. Therefore, the later-maturity stage of 
existing technologies is the timing and WoO of RIP to enter 
the market. 
 
3.2 Basic Hypotheses and Payoff Function 
3.2.1 Basic Hypotheses 
 
In consideration of the actual situation, five hypotheses 
are considered for the WoO-EGT model. 
Hypothesis 1: In the WoO of RIP, high-tech 
enterprises can randomly choose two strategies. The first 
strategy is the selection of existing technologies in the 
market to initiate an incremental innovation process, while 
the second strategy is the selection of new breakthrough 
technologies to implement RIP. The strategy is expressed 
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as { },B LS S S= . The strategy combinations are shown in 
Tab. 1. 
 
Table 1 Strategy combinations of gaming 
Strategy High-tech Enterprise B Breakthrough Locking 
High-tech 
Enterprise A 
Breakthrough ( ),B BS S  ( ),B LS S  
Locking ( ),L BS S  ( ),L LS S  
 
Assume that the proportion of high-tech enterprises 
selecting the breakthrough strategy is p, and the utility 
function is UB. The proportion of high-tech enterprises 
selecting the locking strategy is (1 − p), and the utility 
function is UL, 0 1p≤ ≤ . Meanwhile, in consideration of 
the mixed strategy, the average utility when Strategy BS  
meets LS  is U∆ . 
Hypothesis 2: The equilibrium in the evolutionary 
game is not the result of one-off selection but the process 
of constant trial and learning. When B LU U> , the high-
tech enterprise will select BS  , and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 3: The members in the groups of players 
usually face all high-tech enterprises when making 
decisions. The members are assumed to undergo repeated 
games through random pairing.  
Hypothesis 4: All players are similar after random 
pairing. The difference in the profits between two players 
can be attributed to the different action strategies only. So 
the game is a 2 2× symmetric game. 
Hypothesis 5: The evolution result of strategy 
selection is an evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) 
equilibrium. 
 
3.2.2 Payoff Function 
 
Incremental innovation or radical innovation is 
realized on the basis of the selected locking technology or 
breakthrough technology to obtain returns. The returns are 
assumed to be jR ( }{ ,B LR R R= ). The cost of acquiring 
technology through independent R&D, cooperative R&D, 
or external purchase is C1( }{1 1 1, j B LC C C= ), and the cost of 
excluding technology R&D or purchase is C2 
( }{2 2 2, j B LC C C= ). Thus, C2 is related to market demand 
and output. The corresponding profit is expressed as 
1 2
j j j jR C Cπ = − − ( }{ , j B Lπ π π= ). 
 
3.2.3 Relevant Parameter Settings 
 
The high-tech enterprises are divided into two 
categories, namely, existing enterprises and new high-tech 
enterprises. The former is regarded as always carrying out 
incremental innovation processes with existing locking 
technologies, whereas the latter has the "green hand" in the 
industry for never having carried out innovative processes  
with existing locking technologies in the industry. The 




Table 2 Definitions of relevant parameters 
Symbol Definition 
px Proportion of new high-tech enterprises adopting breakthrough technologies 
1 − px Proportion of new high-tech enterprises adopting locking technologies 
Py Proportion of existing high-tech enterprises adopting breakthrough technologies 
1 – py Proportion of existing high-tech enterprises adopting locking technologies 
 
3.3 WoO-EGT Model Building 
3.3.1 WoO-EGT Model of RIPEvolution 
 
In building the WoO-EGT model of RIP evolution, the 
returns of High-tech Enterprises A and B are expressed by 
α and β, respectively. The return matrix is shown in Tab. 3. 
Moreover, { }, , ,ij ji i j B Lα β= ∀ ∈ . 
 
Table 3 Return matrix of RIP evolutionary game 
Strategy High-tech Enterprise B Breakthrough Locking  
High-tech 
Enterprise A 
Breakthrough ( ),BB BBα β  ( ),BL BLα β  
Locking  ( ) ,LB LBα β  ( ) ,LL LLα β  
 
The utility functions of BS and LS are 
 
( )1B BB BLU p pα α= + −                                                 (1) 
( )1L LB LLU p pα α= + −                                                 (2) 
 
The average utility U∆ of these two strategies is 
 
( )1B LU pU p U∆ = + −                                                  (3) 
 
The replicated dynamic equation of RIP is calculated 
according to Eqs. (1)-(3) as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 BB LL BL LB BL LLF p p p pα α α α α α= − + − − + −   (4) 
 
Given that F(p) = 0, the three equilibrium solutions of 







, 0 1LL BL












− = < + − −





The stable state must be robust to small disturbances 
to achieve ESS. According to the ESS equilibrium 
robustness test, the three equilibrium solutions of Eq. (5) 
should meet F'(P) < 0.  
 
3.3.2 WoO-EGT Model of RIP Evolution for Existing High-
tech Enterprises  
 
Strategies are selected when WoO is opened. The 
players in this case are existing enterprises (i.e., High-tech 
Enterprises A and B). According to the payoff function, the 
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returns are gained by existing high-tech enterprises from 
the game (Tab. 4). 
The replicated dynamic equation of the existing high-





( (1yy y y y
p
F p p p Ap B
t
 = = − +                                 (6) 
where ( )( )1 21 ,B B BA R C Cϕ= − − − ( )1 2B B BB R C Cϕ= − − −  
( )2 .L LR C− −  By taking the derivative of F(py), 
 
2( ) ( 2( ))3y y yF p A p A B p B′ = − + − +                         (7) 
 
Table 4 Return matrix of RIP evolutionary game of existing high-tech enterprises 
Strategy Existing High-tech Enterprise B Breakthrough  Locking  
Existing High-tech  
Enterprise A 
Breakthrough  1 2 1 2,B B B B B BR C C R C C− − − −  ( )1 2 2,B B B L LR C C R Cϕ − − −  
Locking  ( )2 1 2,L L B B BR C R C Cϕ− − −  2 2,L L L LR C R C− −  
 
Table 5 Return matrix of RIP evolutionary game of new high-tech enterprises 
Strategy New High-tech Enterprise B Breakthrough  Locking  
New High-tech 
Enterprise A 
Breakthrough  1 2 1 2,B B B B B BR C C R C C− − − −  ( )1 2 1 2,B B B L L LR C C R C Cϕ − − − −  
Locking  ( )1 2 1 2,L L L B B BR C C R C Cϕ− − − −  1 2 1 2,L L L L L LR C C R C C− − − −  
 
3.3.3 WoO-EGT Model of RIP Evolution for New High-tech 
Enterprises 
 
In this case, the players are new enterprises (i.e., High-
tech Enterprises A and B). The returns are gained by new 
high-tech enterprises from the game (Tab. 5). 
The replicated dynamic equation of the new high-tech 
enterprises is obtained according to Eq. (4). 
 
[ ]( 1) ( )d
d
x
x x x x
p
F p p p Ap B
t
= = − +                              (8) 
 
where ( )( )1 21 B B BA R C Cϕ= − − − , ( )1 2B B BB R C Cϕ= − − − . 
( )1 2 .L L LR C C− − −  By taking the derivative of F(px), 
 
2) ( )( 3 2( )x x xF p A p A B p B′ = − + − +                               (9) 
 
3.4 Matlab Simulation Design 
 
The mechanisms of relevant factors influencing RIP 
are dynamically simulated in Matlab. The dynamic 
evolutionary trajectory of the RIPs of high-tech enterprises 
is demonstrated by numerical simulation when WoO is 
opened, as in the case of changing initial conditions or 
decision parameters. 
The influences of returns and initial proportions (px, py) 
of locking and breakthrough technologies on the RIPs of 
high-tech enterprises are investigated. The technology 
returns are set according to the propositional conditions. 
The initial proportions px and py are 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 
0.9. In addition, given that 1 2B B B BX R C Cπ= = − − , 
1 1 2
L L L LY R C Cπ= = − − , 
2 2
L L LZ R Cπ= = − , and Y Z< . 
The program code is written with time T in the horizontal 




4 RESULT ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 ESS Analysis of Existing High-tech Enterprises 
 
Given that F(py), three possible stable state points can 






















= − < <





According to the stability theorem of differential 
equation F'(py) < 0, the following propositions can be 
obtained: 
Proposition 1.  
When ( )1 2 1 2 2B B B B B B L LR C C R C C R Cϕ− − < − − < − , 
the ESS is 1 0yp
∗ = . 
Proof: In Eq. (7), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )







B B B L L
B B B L L
F R C C R C
F R C C R C
B A BB BF
A A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − <

   ′ = − − − − − > 
 +  ′ − = − > − <   




∗ = is the ESS. 
Regardless of the technology to be adopted by the 
opponent, when the returns of the breakthrough technology 
are less than those of the locking technology (excluding 
1C ), a rationally existing high-tech enterprise will continue 
to carry out incremental innovation processes. The result 
indicates that dynamic evolution can be represented by all 
existing high-tech enterprises continuously carrying out 
incremental innovation processes. Even if minimal 
variations exist for RIP, the high-tech enterprises will soon 
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disappear. However, as long as not all high-tech enterprises 
do not initially implement RIP, the incremental 
innovations will be considered in the long term until 
dynamic changes are realized. The phase diagram is shown 






Figure 1 Phase diagram of proposition 1 
 
Proposition 2. 
When ( )2 1 2 1 2L L B B B B B BR C R C C R C Cϕ− < − − < − − , 
the ESS is 2 1yp
∗ = .  
Proof: In Eq. (7), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )







B B B L L
B B B L L
F R C C R C
F R C C R C
B A BBF
A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − >

   ′ = − − − − − < 
 +  ′ − = − >   





∗ = is the ESS. 
Regardless of the technology to be adopted by the 
opponent, when the returns of the breakthrough technology 
adopted are higher than those of the locking technology 
(excluding 1C ), a rationally existing high-tech enterprise 
will abandon locking technologies to implement RIP. The 
result indicates that dynamic evolution can be represented 
by all high-tech enterprises gradually adopting RIP. The 








Figure 2 Phase diagram of proposition 2 
 
Proposition 3.  
When ( )1 2 2 1 2B B B L L B B BR C C R C R C Cϕ− − < − < − − , 
the ESS is
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2
3
1 2 1 2
B B B L L
y
B B B B B B
R C C R C
p




− − − −
=
− − − − −
. 
Proof: In Eq. (7), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )







B B B L L
B B B L L
F R C C R C
F R C C R C
B A BB BF
A A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − >

   ′ = − − − − − > 
 +  ′ − = − < < − <   




( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2
3
1 2 1 2
B B B L L
y
B B B B B B
R C C R C
p




− − − −
=
− − − − −
is the ESS. 
When the returns of the locking technology (excluding 
1C ) are higher than those of the breakthrough technology 
adopted by only one game side, but the returns are less than 
those of the breakthrough technology adopted by both 
game sides, the variation will involve a small number of 
high-tech enterprises abandoning the locking technology to 
implement RIP. The variant high-tech enterprises will 
increase gradually until 3yp
∗ . If the proportion exceeds 3yp
∗ , 
or if all high-tech enterprises adopt the breakthrough 
technology, then minimal variations of incremental 
innovation processes will spread among them. The phase 












Figure 3 Phase diagram of proposition 3 
 
4.2 ESS Analysis of New High-tech Enterprises 
 
Given that ( ) 0xF p = ,three possible stable state 



























According to the stability theorem of differential 
equation, the following propositions can be obtained: 
Proposition 4.  
When ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 ,B B B B B B L L LR C C R C C R C Cϕ− − < − − < − −  
the ESS is 1 0xp
∗ = . 
Proof: In Eq. (9), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 1 2




B B B L L L
B B B L L L
F R C C R C C
F R C C R C C
B A BB BF
A A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − − <

   ′ = − − − − − − > 
 +  ′ − = − > − <   




∗ = is the ESS.  
Regardless of the technology to be adopted by the 
opponent, when the returns of the breakthrough technology 
are less than those of the locking technology (including 
1C ), a rationally new high-tech enterprise will select the 
locking technology to implement incremental innovation. 
The result indicates that dynamic evolution can be 
represented by all new high-tech enterprises implementing 
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incremental innovation. Even if minimal variations exist 
for RIP, these new high-tech enterprises will soon 
disappear. However, as long as not all new high-tech 
enterprises do not initially implement RIP, the incremental 
innovations will be considered in the long term until 
dynamic changes are realized. The phase diagram is shown 






Figure 4 Phase diagram of proposition 4 
 
Proposition 5.  
When ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 ,L L L B B B B B BR C C R C C R C Cϕ− − < − − < − −  
the ESS is 2* 1xp = .  
Proof: In Eq. (9), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2




B B B L L
B B B L L L
F R C C R C
F R C C R C C
B A BBF
A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − >

   ′ = − − − − − − < 
 +  ′ − = − >   




and 2* 1xp = is the ESS. 
Regardless of the strategy to be adopted by the 
opponent, when the returns of the breakthrough technology 
are higher than those of the locking technology (including 
1C ), a rationally new high-tech enterprise will implement 
RIP. The result indicates that evolution can be represented 
by all new high-tech enterprises gradually spreading 









Figure 5 Phase diagram of proposition 5 
 
Proposition 6.  
When ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 ,B B B L L L B B BR C C R C C R C Cϕ− − < − − < − −  
the ESS is
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
3
1 2 1 2
B B B L L L
x
B B B B B B
R C C R C C
p




− − − − −
=
− − − − −
. 
Proof: In Eq. (9), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )







B B B L L
B B B L L
F R C C R C
F R C C R C
B A BB BF
A A A
ϕ ′ = − − − − >

   ′ = − − − − − > 
 +  ′ − = − < < − <   





( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
3
1 2 1 2
B B B L L L
x
B B B B B B
R C C R C C
p




− − − − −
=
− − − − −
is the ESS.  
When the returns of the locking technology (including
1C ) are higher than those of the breakthrough technology 
adopted by only one game side, but the returns are less than 
those of the breakthrough technology adopted by both 
game sides, the variation will involve a small number of 
high-tech enterprises implementing RIP. The variant high-
tech enterprises will increase gradually until 3xp
∗ . If the 
proportion of high-tech enterprises implementing RIP 
exceeds 3xp
∗ , or if minimal variations of incremental 
innovation spread among enterprises because of the profits 
brought forth by the breakthrough technology. The phase 










Figure 6 Phase diagram of proposition 6 
 
4.3 Dynamic Evolution Simulation of the Locking 
Technology 
 
According to Propositions 1 and 3, the conditions are 
Z = 6, X = 2.5, φ = 2 and Y = 5, X = 1.5, φ = 2. The 
simulation result is shown in Fig. 7. 
Fig. 7 presents the evolution path of existing and new 
high-tech enterprises with different initial points relative to 
the equilibrium points 1 0yp
∗ = and 1 0xp
∗ = , respectively. 
The smaller the proportion is for high-tech enterprises to 
initially select the breakthrough technology, the slower 
will these enterprises approach the equilibrium point 0, and 
vice versa. 
 
4.4 Dynamic Evolution Simulation of the Breakthrough 
Technology 
 
According to Propositions 2 and 5, the conditions are 
Z = 2.5, X = 5, φ = 1.5 and Y = 1.5, X = 2.5, φ = 2. The 
simulation result is shown in Fig. 8. 
Fig. 8 presents the evolution path of existing and new 
high-tech enterprises with different initial points relative to 
the equilibrium point 2* 1yp = and
2* 1xp = , respectively. The 
smaller the proportion is for high-tech enterprises to 
initially select the breakthrough technology, the faster will 
these enterprises approach the equilibrium point 1, and vice 
versa. 
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(a) [px, py]=[0.5, 0]
Proposition 1 Proposition 4
1* 0yp = 1* 0xp =
 
Figure 7 Effect of initial proportion of selecting breakthrough technology on evolution results ( 1 0p ∗ = ) 
 
Proposition 2 Proposition 5
2* 1yp = 2* 1xp =
 
Figure 8 Effect of initial proportion of selecting breakthrough technology on evolution results ( 2 1p ∗ = ) 
 




Figure 9 Effect of initial proportion of selecting breakthrough technology on evolution results ( 3* Bp
A
= − ) 
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4.5 Dynamic Evolution Simulation of the Breakthrough and 
Locking Technologies 
 
According to Propositions 3 and 6, the conditions are 
Z = 5, X = 5, φ = 2.5 and Y = 5, X = 5, φ = 2.5. The 
simulation result is shown in Fig. 9. 
Fig. 9 presents the evolution path of existing and new 
high-tech enterprises with different initial points relative to 
the equilibrium point p3∗, where 3*yp  = 0.33, or 
3*
xp  = 0.55. 
If the proportion of existing high-tech enterprises initially 
selecting the breakthrough technology is 3*y yp p<  (or
3*
x xp p< for new high-tech enterprises), then py (or px) 
continues to increase until 3*yp (or
3*
xp ), and vice versa. In 
addition, the greater the value of 3*y yp p−  (or
3*
x xp p− ) 
is, the faster the high-tech enterprises will approach the 
equilibrium point 3*yp  (or
3*




To overcome the research gap regarding the impact 
mechanism and influencing factors of the dynamic 
evolution of RIP among high-tech enterprises, the WoO-
EGT model of the dynamic evolution of RIP was built by 
combining WoO and EGT. This study analyzed the 
evolution results of the RIPs of existing and new high-tech 
enterprises. Then, the effect of the returns and initial 
proportion of breakthrough technologies was dynamically 
simulated in Matlab. The following conclusions were 
obtained: 
(1) WoO is the best opportunity for high-tech 
enterprises to implement RIP, and this finding has been 
verified by the WoO-EGT model. Under the WoO context, 
existing technologies are limited to incremental innovation. 
The three evolution results on the RIPs of high-tech 
enterprises are as follows: only locking technology in the 
market, only breakthrough technology in the market, and 
coexistence of locking technology and breakthrough 
technology in the market. The breakthrough technologies 
of the latter two evolution results are in accord with market 
conditions, and RIP can be successfully achieved.  
(2) The decisive role of the returns of breakthrough 
technology on the evolution results of RIP can be deeply 
analyzed by using the WoO-EGT model and its simulation 
in Matlab. Regardless of the technology to be adopted by 
high-tech enterprises, when the returns of breakthrough 
technology are higher than those of locking technology, 
both existing and new high-tech enterprises will eventually 
select the breakthrough technology to implement RIP, and 
vice versa. In addition, when the returns of locking 
technology are higher than those of breakthrough 
technology adopted by only one game side, but the returns 
are less than those of breakthrough technology adopted by 
both game sides, the high-tech enterprises adopting locking 
technology and breakthrough technology can separately 
realize certain proportions of the market. 
(3) The influence of the initial proportion of 
breakthrough technology on the evolution speed of RIP can 
be dynamically detected on the basis of WoO-EGT model 
and its Matlab simulation. The farther the initial proportion 
point of breakthrough technology from the ESS 
equilibrium point, the faster the existing and new high-tech 
enterprises will approach the ESS equilibrium point. By 
contrast, the closer the initial proportion point is to the ESS 
equilibrium point, the slower the existing and new high-
tech enterprises will approach the ESS equilibrium point.  
The application of the WoO-EGT model and its 
Matlab simulation to the dynamic evolution analysis of 
RIPs of high-tech enterprises can expound the three results 
of dynamic evolution and the impact mechanism of the 
returns and initial proportion of breakthrough technology, 
which is of great importance to high-tech enterprises 
implementing RIP in the WoO context. The WoO-EGT 
model can effectively analyze the RIPs of high-tech 
enterprises. Apart from helping overcome the deficiencies 
of the static model, new decision-making ideas and 
methods for RIP analysis can be achieved, thus 
contributing to the improvement of the success rates of 
radical innovation. 
Despite the new findings, constraints related to the 
payoff function have been observed. The return function of 
RIP in this study has taken into account technology cost, 
production cost, and the first-move dominance coefficient. 
However, other factors can be included, such as 
government subsidies. In the future, the integration of 
government subsidies in the payoff function can further 
enhance the impact mechanism results derived from the 
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